TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS-A REPLY
EDWIN BORCHARD" THE authors of the articles under reply, Messrs. McDougal and Lans,' have, like McClure, essayed to show that the treaty and the executive agreement are interchangeable, and, since executive agreements are simpler to conclude, they advocate disregarding as obsolete the treaty-making power, requiring, as it does, the consent of twothirds of the Senate, and substituting for it the use of the executive agreement. In that demand they differ radically from the constitutional conclusions which the writer, as well as many other students of the subject, have reached.
To give their proposal a more "democratic" tinge, the authors propose what they call the Congressional-Executive agreement, t Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
The authors of the opus under reply, in contesting my generally accepted view that the President has only limited powers in making executive agreements and that the treatymaking power has not become the secondary wreck-"a vermiform appendix"-which the authors portray, feel it incumbent upon themselves to explain my views on the treaty and the executive agreement by reason of my general views on foreign policy. Apart from the fact that I should prefer to be my own interpreter instead of being represented by disconnected passages quoted or, more generally, paraphrased, out of context by hostile critics, my views on foreign policy have no relation, so far as I know, to my views on the treatymaking power. Nor can conclusions reached after thirty-five years of professional contacts, official and unofficial, with many of the governments of Europe and Latin America be characterized as merely "preconceptions." These latter have long been entertained, though I never knew before that a person who favors economic agreements, especially commodity agreements, became stamped as a "neo-Marxist." No effort will be made in replying to their article to make reference to the caustic personal remarks which the authors indulge.
In undertaking the Herculean task of showing that the executive agreement and the treaty have become interchangeable and in supporting the McClure view [WALLACE MC-CLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941) ] that anything can be done by executive agreement or the suggested Congressional-Executive agreement that heretofore has been done by treaty, the authors have consumed over 200 pages. In presenting tile traditional view sustained by such authorities as Moore, Dodd and Hyde, I required 19 pages. While the authors' research is commendable, it would hardly have been required had the contention advanced by them represented an obvious or generally comprehended position. Nor would a constitutional amendment as proposed by the House Judiciary Committee have been required or been debated in May 1945 with only derogatory references to the executive agreement. The alleged "complete certainty" by which they support the interchangeability of the two methods of binding the United States is engaging. I shall endeavor to demonstrate its palpable invalidity. The reader will, I trust, pardon my occasional use of the pronoun of the first person, since the articles under reply are a challenge of myself and an article that I ventured to write entitled Shall the Executie Agreement Replace the Treaty? (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 664 (hereinafter cited as 53 YALE L. J. 664).
1. Hereafter referred to as the authors or the gentlemen. The article under reply, Treaties and Congressional-Executire or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Insirilments of National Policy, will be cited as Treaties.
which, as a Congressional approval of executive agreements already made, has no roots in history, but is deemed by the authors to stand on an equally good footing with the executive agreement concluded pursuant to an act of Congress, of which there are illustrations in the postal and tariff agreements concluded ever since early days in the case of postal agreements and since 1890 in the case of tariffs. The authors maintain that they are justified in advocating this step by reason of the alleged defects of the treaty-maldng pover and by the fact that a "usage" has grown up not only in favor of the Congresssponsored executive agreement but in favor of the agreement concluded by the President under his independent powers as Commanderin-Chief and diplomatic representative of the United States, from which they draw the inference that the executive agreement which is Congressionally approved-by simple majority-is a generous concession to the doubters of the consequences of a broad executive power.
The gentlemen begin their thesis with an analogy between the constitutional treaty and the executive agreement, by positing the supposed plenary power of Congress 2 to deal with all aspects of foreign affairs, 3 in spite of the fact that a constitutional amendment, discussed May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945,4 -as deemed by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 5 to be necessary in order to give the House a voice in treaty-maldng. They then observe that the Congress has conferred on the President the power to make numerous executive agreements, notably in the field of tariffs, the mails (Postmaster General), copyright, trademarks, and on a variety of other subjects within the power of Congress.c They also observe that the
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President may, by virtue of his own independent power as Commanderin-Chief and diplomatic officer, conclude numerous executive agreements, such as claims settlements, modi vivendi, provisional arrangements pending a treaty, protocols of agreement on particular diplomatic affairs, and even in late years a number of agreements with or without a time limit on subjects that cannot be considered unimportant.
They then maintain that since the Constitution leaves executive agreements unmentioned, it naturally draws no line between the subjects appropriate to treaties and to executive agreements; I hence an arrangement or understanding on any subject can be called a "treaty" I but, since it need not be submitted to the Senate, it may be included within the framework of an executive agreement. They then propose that since these things must be conceded to be valid, a conclusion by no means accepted, it is only a slight step to permit the President to make' any executive agreement he desires and if Congress approves it, directly or indirectly, it becomes binding as law, national and international, so that the treaty-making power has become a needless encumbrance, a "vermiform appendix" I which can be dispensed with as useless.
To reinforce their case the gentlemen usually speak of "authorization and sanction" in the same phrase, meaning that if an executive agreement is "authorized" by Congress (authorization is not an accurate word) why cannot Congress "sanction" a Presidential agreement after he takes the initiative? 10 The sorry result of such a recent effort, ( McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 216); again, it is "a non-expressed exclusiveness" (id. at 224). Obviously the gentlemen's suggestion that the treaty-making clause in the Constitution was not "exclusive," is a straw man of the type frequently set up by the gentlemen. When they suggest (id. at 202) that the making of treaties requires "the validation or approval of the agreement by the appropriate constitutional authority," they fail to note the distinction between the Senate and Congress. They assume it to be agreed that the Congress can "validate" agreements negotiated by the President as the law of the land. That is supposed to be "obvious."
7. The authors say (id. at 195-6), ". it seems clear that the practices and doctrines of international law neither afford any criteria for distinguishing between treaties and executiye agreements nor attach to such a distinction any differences in legal consequences." This is elusive. We are discussing the distinction in constitutional, not international, law. The fact that no line between them is drawn in the Constitution gives proponents of the executive agreement an ostensible springboard. But practice has indicated the proper limits of an executive agreement and the subjects and conditions customary for treaties. In case of doubt, the Senate should and does often assert its prerogatives, as in the cases of the oil agreement (see infra, p. 634) and the Connally Resolution, Nov. 5, 1943. cussed, 12 are to them persuasive that an executive agreement has now miraculously achieved the same status as a treaty. 13 In order to avoid any possibility of misrepresenting the gentlemen's position, I quote the major elements of their thesis, with a brief comment of my own. They say:
"What is completely certain is that the powers of the Congress can be superadded to those of the President, and that the two sets of powers taken together are plenary." " Thus, two limited powers, each of which leaves large gaps, when added together-which is directly contrary to precedent-become plenary powers. This seemed unknown to any member of Congress participating in the debates on the proposed constitutional amendment, May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945.
"Nor would it appear that any effective question can be raised about the powers of the whole Congress and the President either to frame policies for controlling the conduct of negotiations or to make any agreements concluded the law of the land." 1 This rests on assertion, but if designed to claim that the Congress can approve or ratify any or all agreements of the President, it is contrary to the evidence. The gentlemen assume as an undisputed premise what they must prove as a conclusion.
Because "the powers of the Federal Government are ample to deal with any problem" of international relations," 0 the conclusion is drawn that the President can make any treaty or agreement he likes, with Congress if necessary. An executive agreement is said to be "entirely upon a par with the treaty," on a "par in every respect." 11 But the Pink case did not say this; the conclusion is a non-sequitur and rests solely on assertion.
"... throughout our history . . . international agreements" other than treaties are said to have been made "on all important subject matters" with identical consequences as in the case of treaties.' 8 This is an assertion, not a demonstration, and will be disproved presently. 12 . Infra, pp. 646-8. 13. While every treaty is an agreement, it is submitted that not every agreement is a treaty.
14. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 246. 15. Id. at 222. Negotiation, in the authors' view, seems to include the making of agreements. That would give the President unlimited powers, since he is, or can be, the sole negotiator of treaties. Congressional action in guiding his policies in negotiations could have only persuasive force. See id. at 187-8. If the President has the option of selecting the method of obtaining consent, why can Congress "question the procedure" (id. at 188)?
16. [Vol. 54: 616
It could be said that some matters have uniformly been the subject of treaties.
". .. the other relevant clauses of the Constitution [besides the 'treaty-making' clause] granting powers to the Congress and the President . . . are meaningful only if they include the authorizing or sanctioning of international agreements." 1 In other words, Article I, Section 8, and Article II of the Constitution have no meaning, the gentlemen suggest, if they do not authorize or sanction international agreements. This is a non-sequitur.
". .. hundreds of precedents confirmed by interpretations of Supreme Court Justices, Presidents, and Congressmen, and extending throughout the 150 years of our national history . . . sustain the use of Congressional-Executive and Presidential agreements as alternatives to 'treaties'. . . ." -One might suspect that this is slightly rhetorical; the CongressionalExecutive agreement as a ratification of prior agreements is unlmown in practice; the Presidential agreement is admittedly limited in scope, 1 and hence could not be the alternative to a treaty.
Congressional-Executive agreements are not only those authorized by Congress within their authority, but "sanctioned by the Congress after the fact of negotiation." 22 This is the authors' thesis. No evidence or practice supports the theory; if it is an agreement, not conclusive but subject to approval by Congress, it collides head-on with the function of the Senate. Moreover, would the authors include all agreements, or only those-necessarily limited-within the President's independent powers? If the latter are excluded, which do they include?
"[There is] an agreement-making procedure under the control, in some instances, of the Congress and the President, and, in other instances, of the President alone." both constitutional practice and decision for 150 years and the words of the constitutional document itself," it is added, "completely confirm this view." 23 There is no connection, it is submitted, betwveen the powers conceded to vest in Congess and in the President and the authors' claim of Congressional power to raify Presidential agreements. 24 The examples given by Wright and Treaty of 1909 with Canada, required submission to the Senate, upon the con-ent of which the agreement was made and ratified. The authors' effort to show that a treaty and an executive agreement are of the same character and are interchangeable admits the difference in the nature of the two instruments but seeks to give them an identical effect nationally and internationally.
When the authors admit, as they are obliged to do, that the President has powers only when acting "within the scope of his independent powers" (McDougal and Lans, Treiaes, at 199) and that his emecutive agreements have "substantially" the same status as treaties, the assertion that this is true "under both international law and the municipal law of the United States" is necessarily unwittingly misleading-treaties cannot be terminated unilaterally at will-and the admission that the executive agreement is limited would -em to admit away the case for interchangeability.
10,451
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To prove that the authors' reasoning involves a fatal fallacy and that it is unwittingly unsound and impractical, the following pages have been written. On the practical side, apart from the fact that other opponents of the two-thirds rule, including The New York Times, Professor Colegrove, and some members of the House of Representatives, regard the independent -executive agreement, recently expanded beyond its normal, admitted functions, as not "honest," 11 an "evasion of the Constitution," 14 a "subterfuge," 11 a "circumvention of the Constitution," 36 it must be obvious that no great number of Senators will be found to vote for the proposed Congressional-Executive agreement, a device conceived to bring about the demise of the Senate's treaty-making power. Indeed, little in the recent history of politics justifies any belief in the theory that the Senate will or can voluntarily participate in the termination of its constitutional functions as the coequal partner in the making of treaties, or that it will silently acquiesce in the encroachment of an ambitious Executive upon its functions. This is not to deny that Congress has a considerable and undefined power in the field of foreign relations under the "necessary and proper" clause. We have seen this power in operation in the Act of 1798 declaring limited hostilities with France, in the authorization or declaration of embargoes, in the annexation of foreign territory, in the Panama Tolls Act and its repeal, and in the so-called Neutrality Acts of 1794, 1818, 1935, 1937, 1939 . But this is far from admitting the authors' thesis, as it is understood, that Congress can authorize the Executive to make any agreement in any department of foreign affairs, and that in the absence of advance authorization, it can approve, by joint resolution of Congress, what he has concluded definitively or tentatively.
Not only does an approved usage establish that a large number of subjects have been customarily dealt with by treaty, but it is submitted that the encroachments on the treaty-making power of recent years made by executive agreement cannot be blindly accepted as evidence of an established usage. 7 Attorney General Jackson in the "destroyer deal" legal opinion of August 1940 indicated that a line of division could be found in the criterion whether the transaction could be immediately consummated or imposed future obligations upon the legislature, to which the Executive could not commit the country. The former, an executed act and requiring no legislative commitment, when performed in his function as Commander-in-Chief, he believed might be concluded by executive agreement; the latter, the imposition of future obligations, required a treat,. But wherever the line is drawn, in case of doubt, and in the event that there should be any substantial opinion in the Senate insisting that the arrangement should be made by treaty, no President should hesitate in adopting the method provided in the Constitution of seeling Senate approval instead of rezolvmng the doubt in his own favor.
To make the Congressional-Executive agreement a reality and make the whole Congress rather than the Senate a partner in the treatymaking process assumes a radical change in the Constitution, the creation of machinery by which the Senate will voluntarily retire from the field and permit all agreements with foreign Powers to be made by the Executive or by the Executive with Congress, and the establishment of a method by which the agreement can be submitted to Congress for its examination and alteration, to be followed by Congressional adoption, rejection or change, and formal Presidential ratification. But since the President can, under the authors' suggested proposal, disregard any change made by Congress and make his own agree-37. The use of the President's power to make executive agreementn encroaching on the Senate's treaty-making power was not by me "found justifiable" (MeDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 246, note 133) but was explained or "justified" on the theory that the Sanate, not having openly protested, had tacitly acquiesced.
38 While some of the recent executive agreements can be explained under the head of the war power, others, like the Wheat Agreement, the Silver Agreement, the Aviation and Air Transport Agreements, unemployment insurance benefits, the St. Lawrence Seaway project, agricultural experimental stations, health and sanitation, finances of foreign countries, to mention but a few, cannot be thus explained. To use this evidence of encroachment as evidence of a growing "usage" is to fail to distinguish the approved from the disapproved. It is like a writer on intervention who, writing on the "law of intervention," assembled all the interventions he could find, and, on the assumption that the law could be found in the practice of nations, induced the law from the practice, whether good or bad. This is not the first time that the violation of the limitations of law has been used to justify the doctrine of nullification. Fortunately, unlike some aspects of international law, the Constitution is a written document. 
III
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consoling expressions as "all but," "not very dissimilar," "most," "reasonably durable," 41 or by such vague words as "functional," "instrumental," etc., etc. No light is thrown on the question by the statement of the authors that all forms of international engagement, whatever the name given them, are in effect "treaties," 4S but the gentlemen imply, strangely, that they may all therefore be considered as executive agreements, constitutionally. "Treaties," in the constitutional and legal sense, have acquired a special significance, possessed by no other type of international document, because the Constitution mentions them alone and gives them a special constitutional protection. The "compact clause" 41 shows that the Founders were not unaware of the distinction between treaties and lesser instruments.
The differences between treaties and executive agreements can best be shown by presenting an outline in parallel columns and then elaborating the outline in succeeding paragraphs. national obligation remains binding.
5.
A treaty has a special significance in constitutional law. It can repeal an act of Congress.
6. A treaty, by the Constitution, is the "supreme law of the land."
7.
Only a new treaty can alter or modify an earlier treaty.
8. A treaty is submitted to the Senate for formal consideration and consent, rejection, amendment or reservations.
9.
A treaty lasts, with unimportant exceptions, as long as its terms provide.
10.
No secret treaty can be made by the United States. Treaties-must be published.
they wish it to continue, it is by voluntary act. An executive agreement is subject to repeal by act of Congress domestically and internationally. Unilateral indication of desire to terminate suffices. Repeal of authorizing statute suffices.
An executive agreement is unmentioned in the Constitution and has grown only through the necessity of maling ageements of a character not to warrant submission to the Senate. It can be repealed by Congress at any time, but cannot repeal an act of Congress. It can of course be nullified or abrogated by treaty, prior or subsequent.
An executive agreement, with a few exceptions as to contrary state law or when made pursuant to act of Congress, is not supreme law of the land.
An executive agreement cannot alter or modify a treaty.
An executive agreement is not "submitted" to Congress for consideration or for approval, rejection, amendment or reservations. There is no procedure for subsequent approval, sanction or ratification by Congress.
An executive agreement is terminable at any time at the unilateral vish of one of the parties. This is true even if it purports to run for a given number of years. No successor to the Preident is bound by the latter's agreement, although he may consent to permit it to stand.
An executive agreement invites secrecy since the President can make it vithout notifying anybody. Several secret agreements are now known.
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54: 616 Now to elaborate on these points: 1. Scope. A treaty, under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland 1o and Geofroy v. Riggs, 5 ' may deal with any matters properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign Power. It is not therefore limited to the subjects placed by Article I of the Constitution within the limited legislative powers of Congress or to the subjects on which Congress has legislated in practice. The Constitution is based on the theory that this is a government of limited powers, in spite of the "necessary and proper" clause, so that the Tenth Amendment has been deemed merely a "truism," nonessential surplusage. 52 But a treaty, that was once thought to be limited also by the Constitution, 3 can, as is most clearly apparent from Missouri v. Holland, give the Federal Government and Congress new power they never had before. 4 We have already observed that future legislative obligations require a treaty."
The subject matter of executive agreements is strictly limited, 0 even by "usage," to specific powers, under or outside Congressional authorization. Nor can the limited powers of either Congress or the Executive, added together, constitute the plenary power cohtended for.
5 7 Nor is any method suggested by which the two may be joined. 57. In an earlier part of this reply (supra, p. 620), reference was made to the authors' allegation that the President's limited power plus Congress's limited power made the power of Congressional-Executive agreements plenary. If Congress has more power than the limited powers granted in Article I, Section 8, they must get it from the President. If his power is unlimited in the field of foreign affairs, suggested at least on certain pages (Mc. Dougal and Lans, Treaties, at 250-2, 260; "under the separation of powers doctrine, Congressional action might not affect either the domestic effect of the agreement or its status as an international contract." Id. at 338; see also id. at 317, 346), he can presumably abrogate or disregard statutes and treaties (see id. at 316), and now by hypothesis can endow Congress with the power to implement his agreement by a Congressional act, making a Congressional-Executive agreement-which possibly he may immediately disregard. This theory proves too much. United States v. Pink was, it is believed, wrongly decided. Levitan, Constitutional Developments in the Control of Foreign Affairs: A Quest for Democratic Control (1945) 7 J. POLITICS 58, 83, characterizes the Belmont and Pink decisions as not "good" law.
Even if, argvuendo, it were admitted that Congress has all the necessary powers to deal with foreign relations, including the power to authorize all executive agreements, the fact is that they have exercised power only in specific types of cases, whereas the treaty-making power has habitually been used to deal with such subjects as naturalization, establishment, extradition, consular privileges, peace and friendship, restoration of peace, alien ownership of realty, claims against the United States, guaranty of independence and neutrality, multilateral treaties, double taxation, exercise of fishing rights, and other matters. 5 1
But it was never thought that these cases would be used to make the argument that this country is already by law a potential one-man dictatorship.
John Bassett Moore has said of the suggestion that the Executive has unlimited power to make treaties: ". .. In the second place, I deem it to be inconceivable that there should exist in the United States any general sentiment in favor of committing to the Executive Department of the Government the entire and absolute control of the function of treaty-making.
"It is not going too far to say that the existence in the United States of a widespread sentiment in favor of committing exclusively to the Executive the power to make treaties would justify a feeling of profound apprehension and alarm." Does Congress get more power because the President agrees first and they are suppo_-ed to approve, Sanction or implement? If so, they get power not from the Constitution but from the President. We know fairly well the limits of the President's indepmdent power, which includes the recognition of foreign govern ments.
58. See the list of subjects commonly cast in treaty form in the speech of Mr. Merrow, 91 Cong. Rec., May 7, 1945, at 4320.
The idea that Congress could "authorize" the President to make a treaty is violative of the treaty-making power. Congress can hardly "authorize" what it cannot directly ratify. Whether tvo-thirds of the Senate could "authorize" a treaty, thus giving their "advice and consent" in advance, 59 we need not consider. That is not the customary way treaties are concluded. In any event, there is no way to escape the treaty-making power in matters which are properly the subj'ect of treaties. To suggest that the President has the option of submitting an agreement in the form of a treaty or an agreement to be approved by Congress 6 -the authors' proposed Congressional-Executive agreement-is an assertion that when two-thirds of the Senate cannot be obtained a majority of House and Senate will satisfy the purpose. There is no constitutional warrant for this assumption."' If the House and Senate cannot by bare majority ratify a treaty, the House and Senate cannot authorize the President to depart from the Constitution by disregarding the two-thirds Senate rule. Any House or Senate agreement to evade the constitutional provision may serve to forfeit the Senate's privileges, if practiced often enough. But it leaves the constitutional provision unimpaired. Neither by subsequent act nor by action in advance can House and Senate by majorities legally authorize a circumvention of the Constitution. were brought on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice WTite was very anxious to sustain the statute as essential to the operations of government, for he observed, as did Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, that the states were quite unreliable in safeguarding this great natural resource, so necessary to agriculture. But the court stood divided 3 to 3, three judges being ill or absent. The Chief Justice thereupon held the cases undecided upon until a full bench could sit, but in the meantime engaged the writer, then Librarian of the Supreme Court, to make an exhaustive study of the law., from Roman times until the present to endeavor to show that the Federal Government must possess the power of bird regulation. The study, which occupied several months, reached the conclusion that the states alone were the repositories of the power to regulate migratory birds, since by no possibility could this migratory resource be called interstate commerce, which depends on the acts of man. In the conversations with the Chief Justice and Dr. Holmes of the Bureau of Animal Industry, there developed an idea, earlier suggested in a resolution introduced by Senator McLean of Connecticut, that a treaty with Canada might be concluded, whereupon the legislation could be enacted again and rest for its constitutional justification upon the implementation of a treaty.
Thereupon, on August 16, 1916, a treaty with Canada was concluded and approved by the Senate in record time." 4 Because of the impending war, and for other reasons, delays occurred in the enactment of an implementing statute, so that it was not until early 1918 that the second Migratory Bird Act was passed. A federal game warden was then enjoined by the State of Missouri from enforcing the Act, and its constitutionality subjected to judicial test. As is well known, Justice Holmes sustained the Act as an execution of the treaty, and thus proved to the satisfaction of the public that a treaty not only can add to federal legislative power but can do what an act of Congress cannot. It gave rise to the inference that not only natural resources, like fish in boundary waters,, perhaps oil and other substances now controlled by the states, but social legislation, like labor regulation C1 and marriage and divorce, could by the exercise of the treaty power be brought under federal control by means of an underlying treaty., Indeed, . federal power that writers anxious for states' rights protested such a .development. Little has been done to give substance to the fear, but, if it is entertained when limited by the two-thirds rule, how much greater and more justified would be the fear if the plan for federal regulation could be realized by mere majority vote in both houses. This will be the subject of later discussion.
Not long ago, on August 24, 1944, the President submitted to the Senate as a treaty the oil agreement of August 8, 1944, with Great Britain. The background discloses that it had first been intended to conclude the plan by executive agreement. Senators Connally and Maloney heard of the plan and became apprehensive at the proposed submersion of the Senate's prerogative, if the Foreign Relations Committee should decide that the subject ought to be dealt with by treaty. The Chairman, Mr. Connally, thereupon asked a distinguished lawyer, Mr. Henry S. Fraser, General Counsel of the Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources, to make a study of the subject of treaties and executive agreements for the Committee's information. On the basis of historical studies, Mr. Fraser came to the conclusion that there were certain subjects involving future legislation, including oil production and distribution, which could not be dealt with by executive agreement but required a treaty.69
Thereupon, the President was notified and the agreement was duly submitted to the Senate. Senator Connally, after examining the treaty, expressed the opinion that it would never receive the approval of the Senate. The industry learned of the treaty. They expressed the belief that the agreement undertook to centralize the administration of the oil industry in a Petroleum Commission and in the Federal Government-which, however, was not obliged to accept the recommendations of the Commission. By legislation, that government could practically control all production, proration and marketing of oilinvalid in the absence of a treaty. In addition, no immunity from prosecution under the anti-trust laws for following the orders or recommendations of the International Petroleum Commission, when approved by the United States, was assured.
On January 10, 1945, the agreement was withdrawn by the President for renegotiation with Great Britain. 0 suggested. When the Government has made up its mind on the immunity clause, and after the two governments have come to an agreement on the other suggested changes, it is presumed that the treaty will be resubmitted to the Senate. Even though the final treat, does not include an immunity clause, it is hoped by the industry that legislation will take care of the issue. The incident illustrates the danger of the executive agreement, in attempting to commit an industry without its knowledge and to change the constitutional distribution of powers between state and federal governments.
Needless to say, iio executive agreement could perform the extraconstitutional function of conferring new legislative power on Congress. 7 ' If it is alleged that it could, excessive power would be vested in one man. If, like a treaty, it could set aside earlier acts of Congress or even prior treaties, we would have the anomalous position that the chief executive could by virtue of an executive agreement govern this country without the assistance of Congress. And if it should be asserted that he could only govern with the approval of a majority in Congress, the question naturally arises what machinery for such approval is provided, whether such a practice has ever been adopted, and how it can be supposed that the Senate would, by a majority, vote for such an unconstitutional abdication of its treaty-making power.
Possibly the nearest approach to the effectuation of any such plan is in the UNRRA agreement, 72 hardly mentioned by the authors. After the executive agreement was signed, the Department of State called upon a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, consisting of Messrs. Vandenberg, Connally, Green and Thomas (Utah), to study the project and offer suggestions for change. The Committee requested some twventy-seven changes in the agreement, whereupon these were submitted to the other governments and agreed to. Since the agreement looked to a contribution of $1,350,000,-000 from the United States Congress, it was of some importance. When the changes were approved the agreement was included in a joint resolution of Congress and reintroduced as a bill. An assurance was given to the Senate by Senators Connally and Vandenberg that the agreement bound the Congress to nothing, and the Senate was urged not to insist upon its treaty powers. It would seem that the bill was at least an authorization, with the promise of future appropriations. At all events, the Congress made numerous amendments and "reserva- tions" in the bill, whereupon it passed both houses. 7 3 Professor Briggs maintains that the UNRRA was conclusively established by the executive agreement of November 9, 1943, and that the Resolution of Congress was misleadingly but actually an implementation of the agreement. He says that such a proceeding, approving adherence to an organization without contracting pecuniary obligations, is not likely -to occur again and that it is sui generis.
U. S.
3. Ratification. A treaty must be ratified to be binding, 7 4 but only rarely has an executive agreement been ratified by the United States. 5 Usually, as in Executive Agreement Series Numbers 209 and 223, it is an indication that it has been submitted to the Senate as a treaty. 70 Speaking of the Wadsworth (Paris) agreement of May 25, 1923, Secretary Hughes informed the American charg6:
"Inasmuch as the agreement is not a treaty but is rather an executive agreement for the discharge of a claim due to the Government of the United States, it is deemed by this Government that ratification by and with the advice and consent of the Senate is not necessary but that the formal approval of the agreement by the President will suffice. "The Constitution while conditioning the making of treaties upon the advice and consent of the Senate (Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2) contains not a word on the subject of ratification. As there is no reference to such action in respect to [Vol. 54: 616
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS-A REPLY
Occasionally, foreign governments may reserve the privilege of subjecting an executive agreement to ratification of their ovn government, 7s but this is not the American practice.
The authors say, "Generally speaking, diplomatic practice requires a formal act of ratification before an international arrangement will be regarded as binding. . .. ,, 71 Crandall, cited as authority, merely speaks of treaties as requiring ratification. Executive agreements are not ratified and require no ratification. Equally strange is the statement s0 that the decision as to whether or not to ratify an approved agreement or treaty is wholly executive. The gentlemen fail to distinguish the two instruments, whereas in the matter of ratification, as in other respects, they are different.Sl 4. Repealability. A treaty, as its name indicates and the Constitution provides, is binding on the United States. Even though John Jay thought it reprehensible that an act of Congress should be deemed capable, even domestically, of departing from the terms of a treat,, 2 nevertheless it is now generally conceded -3 that a treaty may be reagreements of any character, it cannot reasonably be inferred that if the Pre-ident instructs a Plenipotentiary to insert a provision for ratification in an agreement, he thereby imposes upon himself a duty to ratify solely under the conditions which would constitutionally arise if the agreement were a treaty. . .. pealed for domestic purposes by an act of Congress. But the treaty still remains a binding international obligation of the United States. Its "repeal" merely means that one societal agent, the courts, are bound by the last expression of the legislative will; but the societal agent who represents the United States in foreign relations, the Executive, must give satisfaction to the foreign nation in the form of an indemnity or other amends. The treaty binds the United States until it expires. 8 4
Says Garner:
"Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State cannot justify its failure to perform its obligations under a treaty because of any provisions or omissions in its municipal law, or because of any special features of its governmental organization or its constitu- '... if a government could set up its own municipal laws as the final test of its international rights and obligations, then the rules of international law would be but the shadow of a name and would afford no protection either ta States or to individuals. It has been constantly maintained and also admitted by the Government of the United States that a government cannot appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to demands for the fulfillment of international duties. Such regulations may either exceed or fall short of the requirements of international law and in either case that law furnishes the test of the nation's liability and not its own municipal rules. Not so with an executive agreement. As its name indicates, it is made not in the manner alone knonm to the Constitution as a method of binding the United States; it is an act only of the ExecutiveY 7 When it is spoken of as "binding" on anybody, the word is ambiguous or a misnomerss If a rule is binding only so long as it suits both parties, it is not "binding" at all. s 9
An illuminating correspondence on this question took place in 1894 with Brazil. Congress had just repealed the Tariff Act of 1890 under which tariff agreements for reduced duty were made with several countries, among others, Brazil. On being notified that the agreement had come to an end by the repeal of the "authorizing" statute, Brazil claimed that it should run until January 1895. Insisting, however, that the agreement had terminated instantaneously upon the repeal of the underlying statute, Secretary Gresham made the legal position abundantly clear." Secretary Gresham's view is not to be explained, In addition, Gresham said: "I think it clear that the reciprocity arrangement between Brazil and the United States was terminated by the going into force of our existing tariff law, and I do not think the Fxecutive Departments can act upon any other theory... "The so-called treaties or agreements that were entered into based upon the third section of the McKinley bill were not treaties binding upon the twvo Governments, and the present law is mandatory. Notice to your Government that the arrangement would terminate as provided by its terms would have no force, as the arrangement actually exists no longer." Id. at 77.
"The Constitution of the United States, like the constitution of Brazil, points out the way in which treaties may be made and the faith of the nation duly pledged. . . . Of such provisions in each other's constitutions governments are assumed to take notice. 'The municipal constitution of every particular state,' cays Wheaton, as the authors undertake to do, 9 by the fact that Brazil was charged with knowledge of the vulnerability of the executive agreement or that the Act of 1890 was a special act. All acts of Congress have a special character. The statute was like all similar acts conferring power 9 n the Executive to make agreements in execution of the act.
As That is, one side can at any time withdraw, 93 which is not true of a treaty; and it is believed that this is true in law whether the executive agreement allegedly runs for a given time or provides for a notice of 'determines in whom resides the authority to ratify treaties negotiated and concluded with foreign powers, so as to render them obligatory upon the nation;' (Elements of International Law, Dana's ed., pp. The authors' view (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 346, note 173) that a new President has power to terminate or abrogate a treaty, like an executive agreement, at any time, involves a serious misapprehension. Apart from the admission that a new President may terminate an executive agreement, it is not true that a new President has iower, or any right, to terminate a treaty, if it is still in force. It can only be terminated as its terms provide. It binds the nation and the President. Otherwise, a treaty would have force only as, it suits both parties, like an executive agreement. It would be a voluntary "obligation." The President has, I think, not even power to nullify a treaty, which is all that a purported Presidential termination prior to expiration would usually amount to.
The statement is made (id. at 346) that "Congressional-Executive agreements remain in force unless the act of Congress . ..by which they were ratified is repealed." There is [Vol. 54: 616 termination. The successor cannot be bound by the executive agreements of his predecessor. 4 WNrhile it is perhaps a moral obligation of the signing President to observe the executive agreement during his administration, no such obligation, moral or legal, rests upon his successor. If the successor or successors perchance continue to observe its terms, it is because they choose to leave it unaltered, and not because they cannot cancel the obligation at will.
One significant difference between the two instruments lies in the power of Congress to repeal an executive agreement, whether made in pursuance of an act of Congress or independently thereof.3 We have no provision for ratification by act of Congress. The statement reprezcents a theory only, not a practice.
The authors assume that the President has an option to mahe his instrument of agreement with a foreign country a treaty or an executive agreement to be ratified "by the Senate or by Congress." It is submitted that there is no such alternative, and that the fuggeZtion involves a change in this form of government. The treaty clause was well considered and is not a thoughtless compromise (see note 157 infra).
If 95. The authors say (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 33S): "Clearly any Precident has power to terminate the internal status of such agreements as the law of the land." How can this be done if it binds the nation? Either the authors agree with my thezis that the executive agreement is not binding on the nation, or Congress alone may terminate. If the President has the power to terminate he must also have the power to terminate the external status. If this is so, the authors thereby admit the vulnerability of the executive agreement made under the President's independent power.
He cannot do that with a treaty. If so, why has this not been done, except under legislative direction or acquiescence, and never contra?
The executive agreement also may be terminated, the authors admit, "indirectly, by the enactment of conflicting or inconsistent legislation." Id. at 336; applied to executive agreements, id. at 337-3; see also id. at 199 (agreements "made pursuant to the PrecidCnt'a authority alone, when within the scope of his independent powers, have . . . cubstantially the same status as treaties . . . except in some cases where there is contradictory lgdi-lation"), 343 (". . . -hen it becomes necesmary or appropriate because of the cnactrnent of contrary legislation to terminate an executive agreement . . .". and, ". . . an executive agreement (like a treaty) is superseded domestically as a general rule, by enactment of contrary legislation . . .). Not so if a treaty. "But where [agreements negotiated by the President] are predicated upon the President's independent constitutional powers, cuch a in the field of foreign relations, under the separation of powers doctrine, Congre':ional action might not affect either the domestic effect of the agreement or its status as an international contract." Id. at 33S. This would appear to qualify what has just Lbeen admitted. But it cannot be qualified.
If the President has entire control of the executive agreement and can make it alternatively with a treaty, why does he need any authority from Congrczs, as in the case of the tariff treaties and Field v. Clark? By hypothesis he had that power before, Eo that the Congressional direction or request would seem to be superfluous.
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL already seen that the former is automatically terminated by repeal of the underlying statute. 6 That repeal of an executive agreement by act of Congress is equally applicable to those made under the President's independent powers is illustrated by the so-called Gentlemen' "The Executive may act in these matters in one of three ways: he may enter into executive agreements as an emergency matter to protect and further the interests of the nation; he may enter into particular agreements pursuant to a special or general authorization by Congress; or he may conclude treaties subject to the approval of the Senate."
[Vol. 54: 616 three of the aviation agreements concluded at Chicago because, purporting to change the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics law, this should be done by treaty only and not by executive agreement. It is perhaps superfluous to remark that executive agreements on any subject are superseded by subsequent treaties inconsistent therewith. 1 01 5. Effect on Statute. That the Department of State is fully aware of the distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty in its effect on a statute is indicated by the following enxtract: "I ". .. it may be desirable to point out here the well recognized distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty. In brief, it is that the former cannot alter the existing law and must conform to all statutory enactments, whereas a treaty, if ratified by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as required by the Constitution, itself becomes the supreme law of the land and takes precedence over any prior statutory enactments." 1c'
The attempt is made to show that the executive agreement made under the President's independent power prevails over an earlier act of Congress, just as a treaty does.' of the President's power to supersede an act of Congress. 6. -"'Law of the Land." A treaty by the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land"; an executive agreement, with minor exceptions, is not. 11 0 It seems unusual to conclude that the unmentioned executive agreement has become so omnipotent that it has made the treatymaking power of the Senate not only obsolete and a useless encumbrance, but that by usage the executive agreement has displaced the treaty in the exalted place the treaty used to occupy. What has been said and what is still to be said should dissipate any such illusion.
The Altman case"' involved solely the question whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the interpretation of an executive tariff agreement made pursuant to act of Congress, analogous to its jurisdiction over treaties. The Court decided to consider the agreement like a treaty, while pointing out that it was not a treaty. In the cases involving the postal "convention" the courts could not agree whether it was a treaty, a law, or an executive regulation or agreement.
109. Those members of Congress whoin the debate of May 1 to 9, 1945, advocated a constitutional amendment, shared no such theory. They deplored the abuses of the executive agreement and maintained that these might continue unless the amendment were adopted. The authors' concession that the effect of the executive agreement could be tempered by having Congress approve the executive agreement in what they call a Congressional-Executive agreement, is now unknown and would probably require an amendment to the Constitution. The authors assert (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 317, 338, 346) that the President "might" disregard acts of Congress and make his own agreements within his unstated constitutional powers, claimed on various pages to be in effect unlimited (see supra, p. 620). This would make him literally omnipotent. And if he has power to make his independent executive agreements prevail over acts of Congress, they must also prevail over treaties.
110 [Vol. 54: 616
It actually is an administrative regulation carrying out a mandate from Congress, which has left the power to conclude such agreements to the Postmaster General and the President. Since it involves no vital private interest, but at most an administrative matter, it seems proper to leave the question of reciprocal postal arrangements for letters and parcels and money orders to an executive official qualified to pass upon such questions. That brings up the tariff agreements concluded pursuant to the Acts of 1890, 1897, 1909, 1922, 1930 . In all these cases Congress had indicated the rates that it wished to apply if the President found certain facts to exist or if he made a reciprocal agreement with a foreign country. The constitutionality of the delegation of power in such cases has been readily sustained in Field v. Clark, Hampton v. United States, and other federal cases.
But in the Trade Agreements Act a different question is involved. Here, analogous to the postal cases, Congress delegated the ratemaking power to the Executive within a limit of 50%; the question raised is the same as in the Panama Refining and Schechtcr cases, whether Congress can delegate that much legislative power to the Executive. 112 While an argument can be made on both sides, it seems somewhat unusual to characterize as "ludicrous" "1 the suggestion of those distinguished Senators and scholars who consider such delegation to be too great and therefore unconstitutional. So far as the writer is aware, the Government has not aided the effort to find a justiciable case which would place that issue before the courts.
The principal court cases involving the executive agreement made under the President's independent power-aside from the Watts case in Washington Territory-arose out of the Litvinov assignment of Russian Government assets in the United States. There Justice Sutherland in a dictum in the Belmont case had considered the assignment to be "one transaction" with the recognition of the Soviets, 1 an obviously Presidential function. He mentioned this only in connection with the view that the executive agreement, which was a letter signed by Litvinov accepted by the President,"' prevailed over state laws. 10 He admitted the assignment was not a treaty. The case arose only on the motion to dismiss the complaint of the United States, without regard to the Fifth Amendment or the policy of New York disapproving extraterritorial confiscations of property in New York. The case is dangerous and poorly decided because it seems to infer that the President, alone, without legislative support, can change the rights of private property in the United States.
In the following case, United States v. Pink,"' decided on the authority of the dictum in the Belmont case, Douglas, J., held, for the majority, over a vigorous dissent of Stone, C. J., and Roberts, J., 1 1 that the Soviets had confiscated the property owed by Americans to Russian citizens in New York and had so intended, that the Litvinov assignment had assigned this property to the President for the United States, that the Fifth Amendment protecting the foreign stockholder and creditor from confiscation could be disregarded by the United States, 11 ' and that New York policy opposing extraterritorial confiscation was overruled by the assignment. In spite of the fact that no other foreign country has given to Russian confiscations applied to foreign-situs 115 . The letter provides, inter alia, that the "Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not take any steps to enforce any decisions of courts or initiate any new litigations for the amounts admitted to be due or that may be found to be due it, as the successor of prior Governments of Russia, or otherwise, from American nationals. .. ." United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 212 (1942) . No one present apparently thought that this included anything but Russian Government assets or that it included American private property not owed to the Russian Government. Otherwise, the Solicitor General would hardly have argued that the reason the Russian Government could seize the money was because the credit had a "locus" in Russia. The assignment related only to assets to collect which the Soviets could bring suit here. Would anyone have thought that the Soviets could get a judgment confiscating American-held property?
116. The superiority of treaties over state laws extend to "all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 331 (1937) (emphasis supplied). There is no suggestion here that a treaty and an executive agreement are "entirely upon a par," as the authors claim. MeDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 261.
117. 315 U. S. 203 (1942). 118. Stone, C. J., dissenting, said (id. at 242): "As my brethren are content to rest their decision on the authority of the dictum in United States v. Belmont . . . without the aid of any pertinent decision of this Court, I think a word should be said of the authority and reasoning of the Belmont case and of the principles which I think are controlling here."
119. Yet the authors say, as to treaties: "It can be taken for granted that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and other specific substantive provisions of the Constitution constitute limitations on the provisions which can be enforced as parts of approved and ratified treaties." McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 315. I agree with the authors rather than with the Court, for the executive agreement can hardly afford the Executive more discretion than a treaty. [Vol. 54: 616 property extraterritorial effect, and that Russian lawyers assure me that the Soviet law did not purport to confiscate foreign-held property, the Court held that the agreement, as an incident of recognition and the settlement of claims, had "a similar dignity" as a treaty. -Never in American history has such a conclusion as to extraterritorial confiscations or a simple executive agreement been reached, but on its foundation the gentlemen's thesis rests. The fact that the executive agreement had "a similar dignity" only so far as concerns its effect on recognition and in overruling state policy is not emphasized. The Belmont case had used the analogy of protocols, modi vkiendi, tariff agreements, etc.,-all "routine" in character or made under act of Congress; the citation of John Bassett Moore's article shows that no wide extension of the analogy, was intended. The Pink case held the assignment not to be a treaty, but so far as concerned New York policy to have the same overriding effect. The Pink decision raises several questions. If this was a settlement of claims, why was about $5 millions accepted and -300 millions practically sacrificed? The $300 millions of unpaid American claims arising out of confiscations in Russia was the ostensible reason for non-recognition. Russian confiscations of property in New York were not mentioned. The settlement of the $300 millions of claims arising out of Russian confiscations in Russia, instead of being made a condition precedent, was made only a condition or promise subsequent, and the Soviets have never gotten around to madng a settlement. If the claims are regarded as valid in international law, they have been jeopardized by the unfounded dictum, repeated unwisely since the Oetjen case,.
22 that recognition "validates" the acts of the revolution from the beginning of its existence. "Validates" doubtless was intended to mean "authenticates. 
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL owned property in New York been confiscated? If the Russian confiscations in Russia are deemed invalid, how is it that the confiscations in New York are deemed valid, or at least condoned, since the United States becomes the beneficiary? The New York courts still seem to hold that foreign confiscations are invalid in New York when the United States does not become the beneficiary.
12 3 From the slender authority of the Pink case, criticized as erroneous by the Chief Justice and by numerous students of the subject, 124 no such far-reaching conclusion as the interchangeability of treaty and executive agreement can be inferred.
The Curtiss-Wright decision 125 involved a Presidential embargo laid under the provisions of an act of Congress. A dictum as to the scope of federal power admitted that the President was bound by the Constitution, 2 and said nothing to promote the prestige of the executive agreement. In so far as the dictum related to the case before the Court, it extolled only the President's unlimited power of "negotiation" and "inquiry," which would hardly be denied. For the rest, historians have challenged the Justice's views of the "inherent power" of the Federal Government over foreign affairs. In his Blumenthal Lectures at Columbia University in 1918 he himself had plainly stated that he considered the executive agreement as carrying only a "moral" obligation, administrative in nature. 1 2
The authors' opus under reply criticizes my view that the executive agreement was only a supplementary device designed to accomplish minor arrangements within the limited powers of the Executive to deal with diplomatic affairs and as Commander-in-Chief ' 2 -leaving aside his delegated functions carrying out an act of Congress. The nature of what the President could do was quite well understood up to the time of the studies published before 1930. To be sure, the military powers opened the door to armistices and the war of 1917 led to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of that year, with its secret clause. The only way to account for the few important agreements concluded without the Senate is to assume that the Senate tacitly or by implementing legislation acquiesced in them. [Vol. 54: 616
Since 1933 there has been a considerable extension in the use of the executive agreement, and it has been employed for purposes never contemplated by statesmen or writers before 1930. This movement was accelerated since the Ciertiss-Wright decision in 1937, avowing a wide inherent power of the Federal Government to deal with foreign affairs. But these examples of the expanded employment of the executive agreement instead of treaty are not evidence of approved practice but of the encroachment of the Executive on the Senate prerogative. They are not "usage," but "abuse of power." As remarked before the Senate Committee on Commerce, -' which was primarily interested in this question of encroachment by the Executive, if the Senate acquiesces often enough in this invasion of its rights, even under the guise of the war power, they may ultimately lose in practice, though not in law, their constitutional power. They are now earnestly engaged in restoring the treaty power to its constitutional status and it seems that the Constitution will not be further upset. The movement had gone so far that an official of the Treaty Di-ision actually wrote a large volume in 1941, adopting the thesis that anything that could be done by treaty could now be done by executive agreement. In reviewing that book I ventured to question the validity of the thesis.' 3 The authors under reply adopt the same argument, but temper the thesis by requiring the approval of Congress instead of the Senate twothirds rule, thus proposing a solution devoid of practical merit.
Important cases in which the Congress has "authorized" the Executive to act,' 3 ' such as joining the ILO and other international bodies, settling the war debts or entering into reciprocal tariff agreements, both to be approved by Congress, do not demonstrate that the executive agreement is a constitutional compact or is like a treaty. The Atlantic Charter, 32 ostensibly recorded on scraps of paper, can hardly be called the "supreme law of the land." The President's agreements to submit claims in favor of the United States to international arbitration have not been so designated. Even his pledge not to make separate peace in so-called World War II has not been so characterized. We all know that he has wide authority as a diplomatic officer and Commander-in-Chief to make certain agreements on his own responsibility with foreign Powers. But no authority (except the Pinh case, as to the Litvinov assignment, and other cases where Congress directed 
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[Vol. 54: 616 the making of the agreement) has ventured to raise any of these to the category of constitutional treaties or the "law of the land." The same is true of the agreements, published and unpublished, made at Yalta, 133 Casablanca, Teheran and other foreign parts. Indeed, the "destroyer deal," whose legal validity I have questioned 134 as an act of var, gives rise to the question whether the power as Commander-in-Chief has not been unduly employed and should not be restricted by Congress. Justice White in the Insular cases (id. at 267) held that an act of Congress was necessary to "incorporate" territory after a treaty was signed to annex it. The United States lins never been squeamish as to the particular devices used, treaty or joint resolution, in annexing territory. The "series of trade agreements . .. negotiated in the 1820-1840 period" (id. at 273) were local arrangements alleged to have been made by naval officers or merchant vessel captains with native chieftains in Tahiti No executive agreement has ever been declared invalid because few have been considered and those few'have been tariff and postal agreements, embargoes, etc., under "au. thority" of Congress, with the principal exception of the Litvinov assignment. Possibly the Watts case and Tucker v. Alexandroff exemplify simple executive agreements under the President's power. agreement is within his constitutional powers." 133 Again, it is said that "executive agreements have not infrequently been utilized as a method of altering treaties." 117 This would be a startling proposition if true. It would mean that after a treaty has had the formal approval of the Senate, the President alone could modify or alter the treaty and by executive agreement change its tenor, its character and its terms. To announce such a proposition is to answer the assertion. It is in fact contradicted by a uniform practice, 33 in which this government has repeatedly disavowed the power of the Executive to waive, alter or modify treaties concluded with the vote of the Senate.
In response to a request from Cuba to waive the preferential tariff on sugar, as provided under the Treaty of 1902, the Department of State took the position that "the Department of State has no power to waive the American tariff preference on sugar or any other article included in the treaty with Cuba. Such waiver would be a partial abrogation of that treaty, which would require the concurrence of the legislative branch of the Government." 1'3
The United States enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Morocco under a treaty of 1836. France gradually took over the administration of the country and asked the United States to adhere to an agreement between France and Germany of 1910. The Department of State replied that:
as the adherence of this Government to such an agreement would seem to imply the modification of certain of its existing 136. 11cDougal and Lans, Trcaties, at 317. 137. Id. at 334. See also id. at 209 ("numerous precedents Eanction us2 of a cimple executive agreement to alter a treaty or any other international compact"), 243 (the Preident has "authority to enter into agreements which supplement or modify treaties"), 316
("executive agreements have been frequently used to modify or clarify treaties"). ". .. Congress may pass an act violative of a treaty. It may express its sense that a treaty should be terminated. But it cannot in effect undertake legally to modify a treaty no matter what methods it may employ. In doing that it, in effect, attempts to conduct diplomatic negotiations and to encroach on the treaty-making power composed of the President and the Senate." 142 sion for the submission of an executive agreement, as its name indicates, to either house. The "Congressional-Executive" agreement proposed by the gentlemen is only possible within those limits circumscribing the power of Congress in Article I, Section 8, whereupon the Executive may make such an agreement as Congress provides for. In spite of the persuasive use by the gentlemen, repeated many times, of the phrase "authorization or sanction," the practice of submitting to the Congress executive agreements of either type, authorized or independent, for ratification or approval, is unknom to the Constitution. It would at once give rise to a conflict with the Senate, as did the Aiken St. Lawrence bill designed to carry into effect the commitments made in the independently concluded executive agreement of March 19, 1941, with Canada. That was the nearest approach of which the writer is aware to what the gentlemen have in mind.
But far from winning the approval of the Senate Committee on Commerce, it seems to have met their overwhelming disapproval. The reason is not far to seek. Instead of "submitting" the agreement to the Congress--it replaced a similar treaty defeated in 1934-it vas sent to the Congress merely for its "information." The instrument differed, however, from the usual executive agreement, which goes into force on signature, in that it was made subject to the approval of Congress. Yet Congress had no opportunity to consider the agreement, to amend it or make reservations. The only request upon Congress was embodied in the Aiken bill, introduced nearly four years after the agreement. The bill may be deemed to have incorporated the agreement by reference and provided by its passage for approval, and by its defeat for disapproval. But the agreement itself was not officially before Congress, and of course it could not be changed. The Senate on December 12, 1944, rejected the Aiken bill by a vote of 25 to 56, 14 not voting, '-in part owing to the novelty of the procedure, since there is much support for the merits of the project. Assistant Secretary Berle made the suggestion that the reason for sending the agreement for the "information" of both houses to be approved by a separate bill instead of submitting it as a treaty to the Senate, was premised on the belief that the matter was so important that it seemed preferable to let both houses pass upon it instead of merely one, where a minority might defeat it. The explanation did not seem to strike the Senate Commerce Committee as very convincing.':
Let us assume that the Aiken bill could have been amended as Congress desired, and in the end have differed considerably from the agree- 
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL ment of 1941. The gentlemen under reply say that "there is no procedure by which the President can be compelled to resubmit a modified agreement to-the other nations concerned for further negotiations." "0 And yet this seems to be constitutional in the authors' view. It would be interesting to find out which instrument controls the United Statesthe agreement or the Aiken bill which modifies it-and which instrument controls Canada. The authors explain this as the President's power "in many situations . . .to disregard the Senatorial or Congressional veto and consummate agreements on his own responsibility." Thus the President, according to the gentlemen and their novel proposal, is able to defy Congress. This is hardly a persuasive argument for scotching the Senate.
Reference may here be made to the repeated assertion of the gentlemen that the House by its power over appropriations has the power to object to treaties 151 and leave them presumably without force. Apart from the fact that the House has never failed to implement a treaty by appropriating the funds called for, they have no such right, though they might have the power to violate the obligation of the United States. The treaty is a binding obligation of the United States as soon as it has been ratified by the President, after submission to and approval by the Senate. After that the House is under a duty to carry out the treaty by making the necessary appropriation, though individual members have occasionally asserted in debate that the House had the constitutional power to refuse an appropriation. 5 [Vol. 54: 616
Congress is rarely called on to make an appropriation to carry into effect an executive agreement. It was indirectly done in making appropriations to build a lighthouse on Horseshoe Reef and for the naval bases in 1941, months after the "destroyer deal" of 1940. It is believed that this may be considered a Congressional approval of these transac- 
Q.235.
The arbitration treaties submitted to the Senate between 1397 and 1911 (IcDougal and Lans, Treaties, Part II, at 55S) were merely promises to arbitrate legal questionsexcepting all those which are likely to be important. It was fashionable at this pericd to favor general arbitration treaties. While the Senate may have been overcautious in cubstituting the word "treaty" for the word "special agreement," implying that the agreement to arbitrate must be submitted to their supervision in each case, they cannot be said to have interfered with any particular arbitration. To justify the criticism made by the authors it would be necessary to show that the State Department has deired to arbitrate a case which the Senate has frustrated. No such evidence can be shown. Secretary Root had no difficulty in acceding to the Senate's wishes in 1903, and thereupon two important arbitrations with Great Britain were held.
157. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, Part II, at 55S. To show that it is not unuual to require a two-thirds vote for important decisions, as treaty-maling was conceived to be (cf. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 190), a paragraph from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for two-thirds vote of the Assembly on certain important matters may be quoted: "2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercie of the rights and privi-few treaties. Fleming notes seven and Quincy Wright says less than a dozen. Representative Adams, in a table published in the debate on May 9, 1945,158 maintains that the constitutional amendment proposed by Representative Schwabe, ultimately adopted, requiring a majority of the membership, 218 in the House and 49 in the Senate, would have defeated all the treaties except 3. While offered as a compromise when it was apparent to the Chairman, Representative Hatton Sumners, that a two-thirds vote on his original resolution "I for majority vote of those present could not be obtained, it is open to doubt, if the amendment is ever approved, whether 218 and 49 will be easier to obtain than a two-thirds Senate vote of those present.
Quincy Wright offers different statistics of some 1,000 formal treaties, indicating that a quarter were never perfected, and that of these 250 not think they could or really intended to require him to breach and violate, not legally terminate, thirty-two commercial treaties.' The treaties concerning deserters were lawfully terminated under the direction given in the Seamen's Act of 1915. 6 An executive agreement, on the other hand, is terminable at any time at the unilateral wish of one of the parties." 6 7 This is said despite the fact that it is now becoming customary to make trade agreements for two or three years, subject to termination or mutual extension, health and sanitation agreements for a specific time, usually short, naval and military mission agreements up to four years, and agricultural experiment station agreements up to ten years. They frequently provide "unless terminated or extended," sometimes without stating how this shall be done. Sometimes the executive agreement runs for a given period, expressly terminable by notice.
But it is believed that none of these agreements legally binds the nation, because unratified by the Senate. It seems to me that any future President is completely unbound and perfectly free to cancel the agreement if he so desires. 1 ". .. the President was directed within ninety days after the Act became law, to notify the several Governments, with whom the United States had entered into commercial treaties, that this country elected to terminate so much of said treaties, as restricted the right of the United States to impose discriminating customs duties on imports and discriminatory tonnage dues, according as the carrier vessels were domestic or foreign, quite regardless of the fact that these restrictions are mutual, operating equally upon the other Governments which are parties to the treaties, and quite regardless also of the further fact that the treaties contain no provisions for their termination in the manner contemplated by Congress.
"The President, therefore, considers it misleading to speak of the 'termination' of the restrictive clauses of such treaties. The action sought to be imposed upon the Executive would amount to nothing less than the breach or violation of said treaties. . . . Such a course would be wholly irreconcilable with the historical respect which the United States has shown for its international engagements, and would falsify every profession of our belief in the binding force and the reciprocal obligation of treaties in general." Congress acquiesced in this policy.
President Wilson did not decline "to terminate the Congressionally proscribed provisions of . ..executive agreements" (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 347), because there were none. Congress said nothing about executive agreements in 41 STAT. 988. MCCLURE, and other agreements have been permitted by succeeding Presidents to stand unaltered by renewal or otherwise, such as the provisions of the unratified Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty of 1888, which wmas kept alive by modi vivendi until 1912, is no evidence at all of the fact that it was not necessary to renew it by nwdi viendi or Keep it alive by consent. It may be unilaterally terminated at any time. " ' Quite different is the status of a treaty. That cannot in the absence of express agreement be terminated at the will of one of the parties. The very fact that it is a binding international obligation precludes a country from escaping that obligation prematurely. Even an act of Congress departing from the treaty does not relieve the country of its liability thereunder. The difference from the executive agreement is fundamental. It is the same as between a tenancy for life or a fixed term and a tenancy at will.
10.-Secrecy. One of the major objections to the extension of the use of executive agreements is the opportunity they afford for secrecy. The Roosevelt-Katsura Agreement of 1905 was not known until 1924, when Tyler Dennett disclosed it; the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had a secret clause unknown until 1922; the Yalta agreement secretly provided for three votes for Soviet republics. These agreements are now known. How many unknown agreements have thus been entered into we may not know for the indefinite future.
No such opportunity is available in the case of treaties. We have never had a secret treaty or secret clause of a treaty, as is common to European diplomacy. The provision for publicity as a condition of its binding character preclude such secrecy, and not only the practice but the theory of treaty-making forecloses the possibility of secrecy. That is an asset to be appreciated, not deprecated.
This analysis of some of the principal differences between the treaty and the executive agreement will have served as a sufficient commentary upon the authors' allegations concerning "the identical legal consequences of treaties and executive agreements." 170 IV If it is true that the limitations on the powers of Congress deal only with its power to legislate on domestic affairs and not with its power to authorize or sanction agreements with foreign Powers, then Congress can arrogate to itself by the same majorities that enact legislation the power to control all subjects which could become the subject of executive agreements with foreign Powers. As will presently be observed, they could thus acquire jurisdiction over all state matters. The only difference between a treaty and a statute would be that in one case the President signs first and in the second case the President signs last. Nor is this all. If Congress could acquire control over the matters in question because they become the subject of international agreement, it could also enact legislation to carry out the international agreement and thus acquire domestic jurisdiction over the subject, as Missouri v. Holland clearly indicates. At least in requiring two-thirds vote of the Senate some check upon an ambitious President was provided. Under the new proposal, there are to be no checks, as will presently appear, if the President is of the same party as the majority in both houses; and a treaty becomes practically the equivalent of a statute. In the fact that the President and a subservient majority of the party in control could by the simple device employed in a statute (omitting the gentlemen's suggestion that the President could disregard the action of Congress and make his own agreements 11) assume federal control of any matter we find an exotic method of changing the Constitution. Little more need be said to show the impropriety of the Congressional-Executive agreement which the gentlemen advocate.
It is the writer's belief that if the gentlemen's proposal or the constitutional amendment for majority vote were ever to be adopted, voting on treaties might become more political whenever one or both houses were not in the control of the President's party. 1 2 It may be true that occasionally politics has entered into the consideration of the question. This is not necessarily reprehensible and cannot be foreclosed in a popular government. Politics has in fact played a minor role since most treaties are adopted with relative speed and not on party considerations. From 1899 to 1909 the Democrats controlled less than one-third of the Senate. From 1932 to 1942 the Republicans had the same experience. While the role of politics is minor, antagonism to a particular President or Secretary of State accounts for some votes. If the Constitution should now be changed making bare majorities adequate, politics would be likely to become a much more important factor in the consideration of treaties. If the two houses or the President did not all owe allegiance to the same party, the chances are that the defeat of the President's treaties would become a political issue, a fact which might defeat many treaties. The assumption that ratification would by the amendment become much easier may be mistaken.1" Representative Ludlow of Indiana, in his address to the House of Representatives, May 1, 1945,174 demonstrated that majority vote in the two houses, when they are of the same party as the President, is no check upon him at all. He showed how Mr. Farley, Postmaster General in the second administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was able by telephone to muster sufficient Democratic votes to defeat by a narrow margin the Ludlow Resolution calling for a popular referendum as a condition of declaring war. The administration usually has at its disposal sufficient instruments of pressure to make a majority under their party control subservient to its ishes. Much more difficult is it to control two-thirds of the Senate, some of which must generally be recruited from the minority party, even if partisan politics played such an important role as Mr. Holt believes. 1 15
Representative Ludlow had shown in an earlier speech 170 that the President's control of a majority in House and Senate by patronage and other forms of influence is sufficient to disable these majorities from furnishing the necessary checks to his executive power, so that mere majority vote dispenses with that necessity for checks and balances which the Founders sought to insure. Others showed that, far from increasing legislative control, the substitution of a majority for the two-thirds rule would decrease it.ln If now it should be contended that the President alone has the power to make executive agreements of all types in the entire field of foreign relations 178 and that an executive agreement is interchangeable with a treaty, he alone can not only change the statutes of Congress but amend the Constitution if he finds a favorably disposed government, in Canada or Mexico or elsewhere, to make an agreement to that effect.
If, on the other hand, we can conceive of the effectuation of the plan for a Congressional-Executive agreement'1 7 as proposed by the gentle-men, constitutional amendments could be made with no greater difficulty than are statutes, except that a foreign country must be found to serve as a lay figure for an agreement. All the difficulty of amending the Constitution could thus be avoided by the simple device of finding a country willing to make an agreement and then adopting a joint resolution by majority vote in both houses.
As it happened, there was under discussion on the floor of the House of Representatives on May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945, the constitutional amendment proposed by the House Judiciary Committee last December, making the House a participant in treaty-making by majority vote of both houses. Few members appear to have attended the long debate, a fact which The New York Times deplored.' Apparently not one speaker advanced the thesis of the gentlemen under reply that a Congressional-Executive agreement is already within the power of Congress and that a constitutional amendment is not needed. Possibly on account of the opposition, which includes an overwhelmingly adverse vote of the New York State Bar Association,' the House resolution was not brought to a vote. Instead, a compromise resolution of Mr. Schwabe, making necessary the approval of a majority of the membership of both houses, 218 in the House and 49 in the Senate, was adopted 288 to 88, 56 not voting. 8 2 If the new rule should ever be adopted, absence or nonvoting would be counted as a negative vote.
But what condemns to sterility the suggestion of a CongressionalExecutive agreement by which the Congress purportedly acts in approval of the President's agreement, and what makes it a dangerous device for changing the form of the American Government, is that majorities in Congress could thus, by the same majorities as are required for any statute, arrogate to themselves and drain away all state power on any subject they felt disposed to control. Negotiable instruments, commercial law, the law of contracts and torts, business units and personal status could thus readily become Sederal powers by the simple enactment of a joint resolution with Presidential cooperation. Thus, the states could lose all their power whenever a favorable Congress could be found. Can it really be supposed that three-quarters of the states would ratify such a proposed amendment or that a favorable majority in the Senate could be found, let alone the two-thirds necessary for the proposal of a constitutional amendment? Or that it can become a traditional practice without amendment? It seems inconceivable.
No one would deny that the Constitution grows by gradual evolution, least of all a student of constitutional law. That is one reason it has continued to exist with only a few amendments. But to admit this is far from conceding the authors' thesis. Not only is there a difference in the substantive and procedural clauses of the Constitution, but the fact that some clauses have expanded, like the due process and interstate commerce clauses and others, is no reason why the treaty-making clause has become obsolete and a new device, the executive agreement, unmentioned in the Constitution, with or without Congress, has become the overpowering instrumentality represented.
The last-ditch argument of those who oppose a constitutional practice they would improve upon is that the constitutional provision is not "democratic." That is supposed to convince the doubter. If that had anything to do with the issue, I suppose the whole Constitution could be attacked as undemocratic, because the Founders did not too much favor control by the general mass of the people, only some of whom were voters in the separate states. But without using chameleonic terms, there is no reason why important questions should not be decided by more than a simple majority. Until lately this argument and the appeal to "democracy" in treaty-making, as in any other matter requiring a two-thirds vote, was rarely heard. As several of the House members suggested on May 1 and 2, 1945, if a voice for the House in treaty-making is desired, why not require that two-thirds of the House be added to the Senate tvo-thirds? '3 Until then, the Constitution is not likely in this respect to be changed.
Charles Cheney Hyde, in discussing the recurrent proposals to strip the Senate of its treaty-making power by substituting majorities, has expressed himself as follows:
"The recourse to executive agreements revealed in the foregoing sections, however impressive in scope and development, fails to show that the Government has in fact acted on the theory that the President, with or without the aid of Congress, may conclude in behalf of the United States any arrangement which could be concluded through the instrumentality of a treaty. There have been, moreover, instances where a Secretary of State has felt that for purposes of agreement the use of a treaty vas obligatory.
"At the time of the adoption of the Constitution treaties, themselves distinguishable under the then existing practice from arrangements of lesser dignity, were the usual settings that were employed in the making of compacts of largest import and longest endurance. This circumstance strengthens the view that the exact provisions of the Constitution concerning the making of treaties did more than prescribe the manner in which they were to be concluded. The declaration that the President 'shall have Power by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,' sustains the conclusion that it was not to be rendered abortive by recourse to a different procedure for the use of which no provision was made, and that there were to be found tests of improper evasion in the character of what was sought to be achieved despite the absence of a specific textual prohibition. Otherwise, the scheme for the cooperative action of the President and the Senate would have been a relatively valueless injunction, and the solitary constitutional guide for contracting would have been of slight worth." 184 John Bassett Moore, the greatest authority in the field, authorized the writer to say in a review of McClure's book, where the gentlemen's thesis was first advocated, that Mr. We may conclude by another quotation from this wisest of statesmen. Speaking of the so-called intelligentsia of the country, which he holds largely responsible for foisting on the American people the theory of "peace by force," collective punishment of "aggressors," and Executive control or "leadership" in foreign affairs, John Bassett Moore says, referring to the popular faith in the Kellogg Pact:
"The Pact no doubt makes a strong appeal to our intelligentsia, easily the most emotional and most voluble and, as I often think, so far as concerns the realities of international life, the most uninformed, the most injudicious and the most susceptible to propa- 
